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STABLE DETERRENCE AND ITS LIMITS
J. DAVID SINGER
University of Michigan
HERE WAS A HAPPY TIME, not too long ago, when the major dia-
logue on national arms policy was between the armers and the disarmers.
-~- The issue, at least in much of the public’s mind, was whether the nation
ought to pursue a policy of negotiated comprehensive disarmament or one of
national preparedness. There were those who believed that all arms races must
eventuate in war, and those who believed that military superiority was the best
guarantee of peace.
But in recent years, this easy dichotomy has given way to a far more com-
plicated picture. Both the armers and the disarmers have become increasingly
sophisticated, and as a result have divided into a welter of sub-factions, each
advocating a national security policy differing only slightly from that of its
neighbor on the arms policy continuum. Though this fragmentation has led to a
disconcerting muddying of the polemic waters, it must be viewed as a healthy
and encouraging development. And even if one can hardly contend that the
vast verbal and intellectual gap between the &dquo;tough&dquo; and the &dquo;soft&dquo; has been
completely bridged, we are certainly moving in that direction. As a consequence,
it is now more possible to engage in vigorous and meaningful discourse rather
than to restrict ourselves to the vacuous and loaded exchanges of &dquo;sof t-on-com-
munism&dquo; or &dquo;warmonger.&dquo;
THE ARMAMENT-DISARMAMENT SYNTHESIS
There is, however, one consequence of this nascent public sophistication
which - to this writer, at least - appears as a mixed blessing. As the advocates
of gross, crude, and indiscriminate stockpiling of any and all varieties of military
hardware have given way to the new sophistication in strategic doctrine, they
have also succeeded in dividing the ranks of those who had once been ardent
advocates of multilateral, comprehensive disarmament.
This they have been able to accomplish for two sets of reasons. First, by
acquiring and expressing a belated awareness of the risks of nuclear strategy and
weapons preparedness, they have appeared more humane, intelligent, and cau-
tious than their progenitors. And out of this awareness has emerged a remark-
ably thoughtful and imaginative strategic discourse, in which at least some of
the relations between technology and psychology seem to have been understood.’
NOTE: This article, written while the author was consultant in International Relations at the
United States Naval War College, is based on Part II of a forthcoming book entitled De-
terrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy.
Neither the article nor the full-length study necessarily reflects the official views of the War
College or the Navy.
1 Among these are Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race
(New York: Praeger, 1961); Edouard Le Ghait, No Carte Blanche to Capricorn (New York:
Bookfield House, 1960); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton
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Moreover, by shifting their focus from &dquo;defense&dquo; to &dquo;deterrence,&dquo; the advocates
of preparedness have revealed an understanding of the limits of weapons as the
shield of national security, and have frankly pursued (with, of course, some
notable exceptions) a prevent-the-war strategy rather than a win-the-war strategy.2
In the same vein, they have substituted reason and calculation in place of blood
and thunder; whereas the early armers spoke of the Soviets in emotion-ridden
terms, waging a holy crusade against the vicious and godless infidel, the new
breed envisages the adversary as a competent, calculating planner who might
even have some legitimate security interests himself. This sort of stance was
bound to modify the initial distrust and implacable fear which the disarmers
felt toward the armers. Clearly they had become men of peace.
The second set of reasons for the emerging rapprochement may be found
within the experiences and discoveries of the disarmers themselves. Fifteen years
of fruitless negotiation have brought the disarmament advocates to a belated
awareness of certain harsh realities of international life. They have discovered
how complicated the negotiations must be and how complicated and costly any
effective arrangement must be;3 the technical and political obstacles to inspection
alone have become more fully appreciated.4 4 Furthermore, there has been a
gradual realization that any comprehensive disarmament, to be safe and effective,
demands radical modifications in the traditional notions of national sovereignty.
Finally, any original optimism about Soviet cooperativeness has been painfully
altered; the disarmers have discovered that it takes two to negotiate successfully.
It has been this concatenation of developments which led inexorably to a
coming together of many of the armers and the disarmers. As the articulate and
concerned thinkers on each side of the debate discovered that the others were
neither insane nor irresponsible, they found that their differences were not as
great as had been imagined. And out of this dialectic, therefore, has emerged the
rudiment of a new synthesis, and that synthesis seems to be taking shape under
a rubric which is called &dquo;arms control.&dquo;
At this point, however, some verbal sleight-of-hand manifests itself. By
&dquo;arms control&dquo; one might reasonably mean some inspected limitation or reduc-
tion on the quantities, types, and dispositions of the national weapon systems -
University Press, 1961); Arthur Hadley, The Nation’s Safety and Arms Control (New York:
Viking Press, 1961); Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense (New York:
Random House, 1959); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959); and Wayland Young, Strategy for Survival (Middlesex [U.K.]:
Penguin Books, 1959).
’ Though he himself is ambivalent on this score, I would classify Kahn, op. cit., in the latter
category.
3 The most detailed analysis of these negotiations is in Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotia-
tions for Arms Control (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961). Briefer, but perhaps
more insightful, is Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston: Beacon Press,
1960). On the matter of nuclear weapons and fissionable material, see Joseph L. Nogee,
Soviet Policy Toward International Control of Atomic Energy (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1961).
4 On the technical problems, see Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1958), and Bernard T. Feld, Technical Problems of Arms Con-
trol (New York: Institute for International Order, 1960). On the political difficulties, see
Louis Henkin, Arms Control and Inspection in American Law (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1958).
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negotiated partial disarmament. But that would be a premature conclusion, as
the following not-wholly-imaginary dialogue should illustrate.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: Wouldn’t a totally disarmed world be quite danger-
ous ? What if one side manages to retain just a few strategic weapons?
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: How awful! They could blackmail us with ease.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: And haven’t the negotiations demonstrated how
unrealistic it would be to expect total disarmament anyway?
. DISENCHANTED DISARMER: I’m afraid so. We’ll have to go one step at a time.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: Exactly. And as we disarm step by step, what is our
greatest problem?
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: That one side doesn’t gain a military advantage at
any stage.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: Certainly. How can this be assured?
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: By moving slowly, taking all necessary precau-
tions, and keeping the rest of our weapons at the ready. No stage must be per-
mitted to lead to instability in the stand-off.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: How perspicacious! Stability is crucial all the way
and we must not lose our ability to deter them from violations or surprise attack.
After all, we still can’t trust them.
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: Of course not. We must deter them from up-
setting the stability. But we don’t even have that capacity now.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: Well, there is room for improvement, and perhaps
we ought to acquire a better deterrent before going too far in arms reduction.
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: Yes, let’s see what we can negotiate in order to
stabilize our balance of terror.
SOPHISTICATED ARMER: But didn’t you say that negotiations are most difhcult
with those people? Isn’t there much that we can do unilaterally?
DISENCHANTED DISARMER: Certainly, let’s get on with it.
Out of this dialogue,5 therefore, emerges a somewhat unexpected definition
of arms control. The author of the introductory paper for a recent conference on
arms control suggested that &dquo;it is useful to think generally of arms control as a
cooperative or multilateral approach to armament policy - where armament
policy includes not only the amount and kind of weapons and forces in being,
but also the development, deployment and utilization of such forces....&dquo; In
the next sentence he refers to the improvement of the nations’ security &dquo;by
adjusting at least some armament capabilities and uses....&dquo; 6 Thus, from the
5 In addition to the many published books cited above, there have been numerous conferences,
and a spate of articles and unpublished memoranda on arms control in the past year or so
and this dialogue is based on participation in several of these conferences and a reading of
almost all the books, articles, and papers. Another indication of the popularity of arms con-
trol is to be found in the shifting distribution of articles in such journals as the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists.
6 Donald G. Brennan, "Setting and Goals," Daedalus (Special Issue on Arms Control), Fall 1960,
pp. 692-93. This issue is comprised of the papers presented at the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences conference (financed by the Johnson Foundation) in May 1960.
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elimination or reduction of national armaments we have slipped to the more
modest concern of &dquo;adjustments&dquo; in the development, deployment and utilization
of these armaments. And as for the element of negotiation, we replace it with
&dquo;the cooperative or multilateral approach,&dquo; and as everyone knows, cooperation
need not necessarily imply formal negotiation.7 By tacit communication and
informal agreement we and the Soviets can work out, on a unilateral basis, cer-
tain multilateral arrangements which will enhance the stability of the nuclear-
missile standoff. Mutual calculations of self-interest will suffice. Certainly, it is
argued, this is preferable to those long, drawn-out, and frustrating conferences
which succeed only in raising tensions and generating further mistrust.
Having thus dispensed with both the disarmament and the negotiation, our
newly sophisticated armers and disarmers can get down to the main order of
business: the development of a stable deterrence relationship. In this neat and
antiseptic pursuit, we are free to ignore such messy factors as ideology, irration-
ality, domestic politics, and third-party interference. Here we need only con-
cern ourselves with computer-type players and weapons technology, with the
latter apparently the more important. As one of our most thoughtful advocates
of stable deterrence has argued, &dquo;the impossibility of war has to be of a techno,
logical character.&dquo; 8 that, then, is this fascinating new preoccupation, and what
are the principal elements? What is it that our one-time disarmament advocates
seem to be on the verge of embracing?
STABLE DETERRENCE AND INVULNERABILITY
If there is a single key concept in the stable deterrence strategy it is that of
the &dquo;invulnerable retaliatory force&dquo;; from this all else flows. If one’s retaliatory
or strike-back capability is made invulnerable to any kind of first strike by the
adversary, he has a highly stable deterrent. This is because the potential attacker
will know that no matter how much surprise, speed, accuracy, or megatonnage he
puts into his first blow, there will always be enough of the victim’s retaliatory
power left undamaged to permit him to strike back at the attacker’s cities with
punitive devastation.9 The certainty of such reprisal will, of course, deter any
rational decision-maker, no matter how hostile his intentions, from ever launch-
ing his attack in the first place.
Invulnerability and passive protection .
Granted the desirability of achieving this invulnerability of one’s retaliatory
capability, how does one go about it? Bascially, there are six different passive
’ This view is most cogently and persuasively expressed by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Hal-
perin, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
8 Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 296. Italics added.
9 There is a school of thought that believes that the mere destruction of most or all of his cities
and industrial complexes may not be enough to deter a potential nuclear aggressor, and that
the deterrer’s retaliatory strike must be able to hit the attacker’s launching sites, air strips,
staging areas, and naval bases, as well. This is commonly referred to as a "counter-force"
capability, as distinguished from the more modest "counter-city" or "finite" capability. Of
course, a counter-force capability is also a fine strike-first capability, and its acquisition might
well be so provocative as to trigger the attack it was designed to deter. In this regard, see
my critique of the Kahn position in J. David Singer, "The Strategic Dilemma: Probabilities
versus Disutilities," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (June 1961), 197-205.
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means of making one’s strike-back forces invulnerable: numbers, hardening, dis-
persal, distance, concealment, and mobility. Let us examine each technique
briefly. By numbers, we refer to increasing the quantity of missiles, aircraft, or
other delivery system to such a degree that no matter how many warheads or
bombs the attacker delivers, it is always less than enough to destroy &dquo;enough&dquo;
of those possessed by the victim; those that are left because of the attacker’s
numerical inferiority may then be launched on their mission of retaliation. This
is one of the least attractive means of acquiring invulnerability, for two reasons.
First, one is never sure how many delivery vehicles are needed for an &dquo;exchange
ratio&dquo; which gives the deterrer a numerical superiority over the potential attacker,
and second, either side can make it extremely costly to the other by engaging in a
straight quantitative arms race, with no reasonable upper limits.l° A second, and
only slightly less attractive device for the deterrer is to engage in &dquo;hardening&dquo;
one’s retaliatory forces. By placing missile pads or airplane hangars underground
or under some form of protective shelter, one can hope that the attacker will be
unable to get enough direct hits and near misses to destroy very many; those
remaining after the attack may then be brought out into the open, and fired
against the attacker’s cities (assuming, again, a finite counter-city strategy only).
There are two major disadvantages of the hardening approach. One is that it is
nearly impossible to build any shelter to withstand a direct hit and only slightly
easier to protect against a near miss; even as the highly accurate manned bomber
is phased out and replaced with the missile, the latter’s guidance system improves
steadily, as do the charts and maps upon which guidance depends. Secondly, as
rocket thrust continues to rise, there is almost no limit to the size warhead that
can be carried over intercontinental distances, and the attacker can therefore
afford to increase his yield and blast effect in order to keep ahead of the harden-
ing process. The harder the site, the bigger the warhead it will attract, and also
the more fallout, heat, and blast destruction the environs will probably receive.
A third, and somewhat more attractive approach, is that of dispersal. If the
deterrer has adequate numbers of strike-back weapons and merely spreads them
out over vast geographical areas, he compels the attacker to disperse his efforts,
too, and reduces the likelihood that all reprisal forces will be destroyed during a
first strike. The Strategic Air Command is now engaged in a belated dispersal
of its retaliatory bomber force both at home and overseas, but it poses serious
logistic, communication, and morale problems and is far more expensive than a
consolidated deployment. Furthermore, for dispersal to be effective, it must still
be based on impressive quantity. For any retaliatory system to be effective as a
deterrent, it must have a sum of vehicles equal to: the number required to mete
out &dquo;adequate&dquo; (or, to the deterree, &dquo;unacceptable&dquo;) punishment, plus the num-
ber likely to be destroyed by any surprise attack, plus the number likely to fail
in launching, plus the number likely to be intercepted en route, plus the number
10 Some suggestive and useful calculations of this "exchange ratio" are found in a pair of unpub-
lished monographs. See, John B. Phelps et al., "Some Calculations on Counterforce Strategies
in a General Nuclear War," and Raymond Foye et al., "Counterforce Calculations Attack
and Retaliation with Mixed Weapon Systems" (Columbus: Mershon National Security Pro-
gram, 1959).
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likely to miss their targets. This total cannot help but be awesome in its size, cost,
and provocativeness.
Another technique for increasing the likelihood of one’s strike-back forces
surviving a first strike is to place them at maximum distance from the potential
attacker’s launch sites. For attacking manned aircraft, range is a distinctly limit..
ing factor, even if it does nothing more than restrict the size of the payload in
order to make room for additional fuel. And for the present generation of mis-
siles, increased range leads to a significant diminution of accuracy; this being a
function of incomplete mapping and charting as well as still-evolving guidance
systems. The closer your sites are to those of the attacker, the more vulnerable
they are; Thor and Jupiter IRBM’s in Turkey, Italy, and Britain are an example.
On the other hand, moving away from your adversary’s launch sites is often not
practicable, especially if your own retaliatory vehicles are of short range or in-
adequate guidance. And often the sites which are most advantageous in terms of
distance are least advantageous in terms of such factors as proximity to cities,
factories, and transport centers or accessibility to logistic support. Of course, when
retaliatory weapons are mounted in space satellites, the deterrer will have
achieved the penultimate in distance as well as dispersal and mobility, which
are discussed below.
Over against these four rather primitive means of diminishing vulnerability,
there are two other techniques which are just becoming technologically possible;
one is mobility and the other is concealment. Until the prospective attacker can
locate his victim’s strike-back forces, he cannot even begin to destroy them; clan-
destine moving of delivery vehicles from one site to another, concealment, or a
combination of mobility and concealment can make location and detection of
strike-back weapons extremely difficult and thus reduce the probability of their
being destroyed. In nations which are near the &dquo;closed&dquo; end of the open-closed
continuum, concealment is not particularly difficult; the normal channels through
which target information might be ascertained in open-type societies are essen-
tially unavailable in the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies, for example. While
the Soviets probably know the location of almost every airfield and missile site
in North America and Western Europe, we must rely on such elaborate intel-
ligence operations as U-2 overflights and reconnaissance satellites in order to
acquire similar information regarding their launch sites. The inaccessibility of
this information is a distinct asset to them (and as I hope to suggest later, to us
as well) which they are most reluctant to vitiate by &dquo;open skies&dquo; or any other in-
spection scheme. But since our sites are known and thus relatively vulnerable to
surprise attack, we must turn to other versions of the mobility-concealment ploy.
Perhaps the most dramatic result of this effort is the now operational fleet bal-
listic missile system - the nuclear-powered submarine equipped with sixteen
Polaris IRBM’s capable of carrying a nuclear warhead about 1,500 miles.ll At
this writing, only four such submarines are operating, but twenty have been
authorized, and the Navy is seeking at least forty-five.
11 The range of the George Washington’s missiles is announced as 1,200 miles, but the Navy is
giving high priority to increasing that figure considerably in subsequent vessels.
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Another attempt to deprive the Soviets of launching site location informa-
tion is the solid-fueled Minuteman ICBM; though some reports had it that this
weapon (expected to be operational in July 1962) could be fired from railroad
flat cars, it will be somewhat less mobile. Under present plans, there will be a
great many launching sites along railroad lines and fewer missiles, and these lat-
ter will be moved frequently (but randomly) from one site to another, reducing
the probability of the Soviets knowing the location of most of them at any given
moment. And until the B-52 and B-58 manned bombers have disappeared from
our retaliatory arsenal, their vulnerability will be somewhat reduced by keeping a
certain percentage of them aloft at all times. This latter combination of dispersal,
mobility, and limited concealment is designed to assure the survival of enough
strike-back planes to make the threat of retribution credible. But it, too, poses
certain difficulties. First of all, it is extremely expensive and it requires duplicate
crews. Secondly, these airborne carriers of nuclear weapons have crashed in the
past, and in any subsequent crash its payload could conceivably be detonated,
despite many precautions in design and arming mechanisms. Thirdly, from the
Kremlin’s point of view an airborne SAC is highly threatening and provocative.
These then are some of the passive steps by which the deterrer may reduce
the vulnerability of his retaliatory forces, make his threat of reprisal credible,
and keep the deterrent relationship stable. It must be borne in mind that this
relationship is supposed to be relatively symmetrical and basically reciprocal, and
that the Soviet is also pursuing a strategy of stable deterrence. Though this is a
widespread assumption (or hope) among stable deterrers in the West, it may not
be altogether true. and we must not forget that when one side is less conserva-
tive, more daring, and less predictable, he enjoys a certain bargaining advantage
over his more cautious opponent.
Early warning and active protection
In addition to these relatively passive vulnerability-reducing measures, there
are two other kinds of action which the deterrer may pursue in maximizing the
certainty of reprisal against his attacker. One is the institution of an early-warn-
ing system, and the other is the development of interception or counter-measure
instruments. Under the first category the West already has the DEW Line, Mid-
Canada and Pine Tree radar nets, designed primarily for the early detection of
manned bombers at high altitudes and coming from the North Polar regions;
there is also a fairly elaborate radar net in Europe. And just as the first Soviet
missiles began to appear on station in numbers, we completed the basic BMEWS
(Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) installation. To these ground-based
warning systems must be added several new developments of which we will be
hearing much in coming months. One will be the dramatic back-scatter radar
(growing out of the Navy’s Project Tepee), capable of detecting missile launch-
ings instantaneously at inter-continental ranges. This system will give almost
thirty minutes warning time against the ICBM, as compared with about ten
minutes which the BMEWS net can offer. In outer space, we will soon have
supplementary early warning systems provided by such reconnaissance satellite
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systems as Midas and Samos, and to a lesser extent, Tiros. Finally, there is the
airborne patrol system, in which manned and radar-equipped aircraft search the
areas which are not adequately covered by the other devices.
The importance of all these early warning systems to the preservation of one’s
retaliatory force and hence to the stability of the deterrent cannot be exaggerated.
The more time there is available between warning and impact, the more likely
you are to be able to disperse or protect your strike-back capability. It also offers
the opportunity to get your retaliatory weapons off the ground and headed to-
ward their targets in the attacker’s zone of the interior. And the more certain
he is that you can both preserve your forces and strike back, the less likely he is
to strike in the first place. Also significant is the role of early warning as a source
of negative intelligence. That is, the more reliably one can know that the other is
not launching, the less likely one is to &dquo;pre-empt&dquo; in error. Thus early warning
systems fulfill a dual function.12
As was mentioned earlier, there is still a third general approach to the pres-
ervation of one’s retaliatory forces, and that is the active destruction of the at-
tacker’s vehicles. Of course, the easiest point at which to destroy them is on
their airstrips or launching sites, and the ICBM is thus in this sense also an ef-
fective anti-missile weapon. But this is being rather facetious, and it makes little
sense to start the nuclear exchange which you are dedicated to prevent. There
are, however, two general techniques which it is hoped will contribute to stable
deterrence by posing a threat to attacking ICBM’s: electronic counter-measures
and the anti-missile missile. Neither technique is anywhere near solution at this
date, and even if feasible, they are several years away. 13
So far we have discussed the problem of stabilizing the deterrent balance by
means of protecting the deterrer’s retaliatory forces so that no matter how the
would-be attacker plans he cannot expect to be free from devastating nuclear
reprisal. This awareness, it is hoped, will deter him from striking in the first place.
PROVOCATION AND STABILITY IN DETERRENCE
But no matter how much we would wish it otherwise, acquiring &dquo;invulner-
ability&dquo; is only a part (albeit an important part) of the requirement of stable
mutual deterrence, and recent months have revealed a promising concern for
some of the other requirements on the part of those involved in the study and
practice of deterrence. A second and equally crucial part of the stability problem
is that of provocation. In other words, a stable balance requires that we not only
reduce the positive incentives and attractiveness of a strike-first strategy, but
that we also reduce the negative motivation or sense of necessity on the part of a
would-be nuclear aggressor. To illustrate: unless the other side is inevitably and
12 This point is imaginatively developed in Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a
Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, 13 (October 1960), 1-18.
13 
Experience in weapons development suggests that a period of about eight years is required be-
tween the theoretical solution of a problem and the production of the first piece of hardware.
Moreover, just as there are counter-measures, there are counter-counter-measures. A useful
discussion of the problem is in Arnold Wolfers et al., Developments in Military Technology
and Their Impact on U.S. Strategy and Foreign Policy (Washington: Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Study No. 8, 1959). See also, J. David Singer, "Weapons Technology and
International Stability," Centennial Review, Vol. 5 (Fall, 1961), 415-35.
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inexorably bent on a nuclear attack, there is much that can be done to influence
him in either direction. The deterrer can develop a weapons mix or a doctrine
which makes the adversary believe that the &dquo;deterrent&dquo; is merely a cover be-
hind which an actual offensive strategy is unfolding or he can generate an
image of pure defense and retaliation only. If the men in the Kremlin were to be-
gin to believe that we plan a first strike at some particular date, this belief could
easily provoke them into a &dquo;preventive&dquo; attack, despite the other costs and risk
involved. Such is the present nature of military technology that he who strikes
first derives considerable advantage. 14 One way to reduce the temptation of a first
strike is by weapons design and early warning; the other is by persuading the ad-
versary that you have no intention of exploiting it yourself.
What are some of the things each side can do to generate such a belief in
the camp of the other, without at the same time weakening its own strategic
posture? Perhaps one of the most promising is to eschew the building and de-
ployment of weapons whose objective characteristics are as much (or more)
strike-first as strike-back. The more vulnerable a new weapon is the more likely
the other side is to view it as a first strike device, since it has almost no strike-back
potential. American IRBM sites in Britain, Italy, and Turkey are of such a nature:
within easy range of Soviet aircraft or IRBM’s, above ground, and almost unpro-
tected, these weapons are as much a provocation as a deterrent.
Conversely, the attempt to make invulnerable those elements which have
little or no retaliatory usefulness could also be provocative to the other side.
Thus any large-scale program of civil defense or underground factory-building
would tend to have a strongly provocative influence.15 Despite rumors and al-
legation to the contrary, there is little evidence of Soviet activity in these realms,
and this is a good omen. If either side were to push such programs, the other
would have to make one of two assumptions: either the first is planning a first
strike and wants to reduce the destructiveness of the retaliatory blow, or it is so
sure that the second is definitely planning an attack that it must reduce the losses
sustained in the inevitable blow. This latter belief, if conveyed to the other side,
might well convince them that the first is so sure of inevitable showdown that it
might be tempted to get in the original blow itself; the fatal and spiraling in-
stability of such reciprocal expectations should be obvious. Some may contend
that protection of civil populations and industrial plants actually reduces the
incentive to strike, by minimizing the amount of damage that can be done, 16 but
this reasoning smacks of the old and more simple-minded approach discussed in
14 There has been continuing speculation in the West as to whether the Soviet planners now ac-
cept this proposition. Under Stalin, the advantages of initiative and surprise in military
doctrine were discounted in contrast to the "permanently operating factors." Two recent
books, with somewhat differing conclusions on this matter are: Herbert S. Dinerstein, War
and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1959); and Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy
in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1958).
15 See J. David Singer, "Deterrence and Shelters," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 (October
1961) 310-15, for a development of this argument.
16 It should also be noted that the actual usefulness of such shelters in the event of any nuclear
exchange is a matter of considerable doubt. Certainly it would reduce - depending on
warning time - the number of immediate casualties due to fall-out, blast, and heat, but the
degree of over-all protection may be, in the long run, negligible. It should also be remem-
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the opening paragraphs. It fails to explore the matter of reciprocal preceptions
and thus to distinguish between deterrence and provocation. Difficult as it may
be, both sides must - if deterrence is really their doctrine - be willing to sacri-
fice certain win-the-war capabilities in order to enhance their prevent-the-war
posture; such willingness is the hallmark of the new deterrent advocates .17
As a matter of fact, this writer is so convinced of the importance of avoid-
ing developments which are strongly provocative that he would propose that we
attempt to negotiate a ban on civil defense and industrial protection with the
Soviet Union. Inspection would be extremely easy, it would pose a minimum of
interference and would offer little in the way of intelligence-gathering opportuni-
ties ; this latter point is most significant to the Kremlin. The exposed populations
and factories become, as it were, hostages to one’s good intentions, and though
this view may be regarded as cold-blooded, it strikes this observer as just the op-
posite. Faced with the choice between reducing casualties in a nuclear exchange
and reducing the probability of that exchange taking place at all, my values
impel me to the latter course. Others may well choose differently, particularly
if they believe in the inevitability of general war with the Soviet Union.
Another way to persuade the adversary that you may be planning to hit
first is to do everything possible to locate and pin-point his retaliatory sites. If
yours is purely a retaliatory strategy there is no need to find and destroy his mis-
sile sites; they will, by then, be vacant and your only &dquo;legitimate&dquo; desire would be
to deliver retribution on his cities and factories, assuming again that you believe
that this is a sufficient deterrent and have not succumbed to the doctrine of coun-
ter-force &dquo;deterrence.&dquo; 1$ Thus, if one of the major purposes of the U-2 over-
flights was to locate Soviet launching sites and other strategic targets, we were
guilty of steps which increase the vulnerability of their retaliatory forces and
hence vitiate the stability of the balance of terror.19 To quote Professor Morgen-
stern again, &dquo;In order to preserve a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear
plenty, it is necessary for both sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces....
It is in the interest of the United States and Russia to have an invulnerable re-
taliatory force, and vice versa.&dquo; z° The major point here is that the less vulner-
able each side’s strike-back capability is, the less inclined he is to strike first; he
can, if needs be, absorb a first blow and still retaliate effectively.
bered that while the threat of a first strike against cities may be diplomatically useful, its
execution would be of little strategic value. On the matter of casualty-reduction via shelters
and/or evacuation, see Herman Kahn, Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense (Santa
Monica: Rand Report R-322-RC, July 1958); and House Subcommittee on Military Opera-
tions, Hearings ... (Washington: G.P.O., March 1960).
17 There is no intention here of implying that deterrence is a new concept in military strategy.
As long ago as the fourth century, Flavius Vegetius advised his king "Se vi pacem, para bel-
lum" &mdash; if you want peace, prepare for war. But only in the 1950’s has it been systemized,
codified, provided with a lexicon, and given a game-theoretical base.
18 It cannot be stressed too often that as one’s retaliatory capability moves from counter-city to
counter-force, it is (and looks) more and more like a strike-first capability.
19 There is, however, one justification for trying to pinpoint the other’s missile sites: the more
accurately they are located, the easier it is to monitor them by radar and other early warning
devices, thus maximizing warning time and enhancing your own invulnerability as well as
providing better "negative" intelligence.
20 Op. cit., pp. 74, 76. Italics added. 
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There is one final thing that each side can do unilaterally in order to in-
crease the stability of the present and foreseeable equilibrium, and that is to do
whatever is possible to maximize both sides’ warning time. The reason is simple:
the longer you can wait before firing, the more certain you can be that an actual
strike has been launched, and the less likely you are to &dquo;retaliate&dquo; in response
to a purely imaginary blow or to highly ambiguous intelligence. Given the present
limitations of early warning radar and its inherent inability to discriminate con-
sistently and reliably between meteors, bird formations, and other physical or
electronic images on the one hand, and missiles or bombers on the other, if you
can delay your response you are less likely to misinterpret a target acquired on
the scope.21 Of course, if you have installed a hair-trigger response and command
system with inadequate checks or restraints in it, you may end up launching a
first strike rather than a second one, because you fired on the basis of ambiguous
and inconclusive evidence. And if your retaliatory forces are vulnerable, or if
your missiles are liquid-fueled or otherwise require a long count-down time, you
cannot afford to wait very long for confirmation or disconfirmation. Delay could
be fatal, but so could premature response. Thus, it behooves both sides to max-
imize - by technological and procedural innovation - the length of time they
can hold out before firing what is intended to be a retaliatory blow.
Again, there is advantage to both sides in such a situation, as it contributes
to the stability of our balance of terror, and each should therefore do what it can
to lengthen the other’s warning and response time as much as possible. In this
vein, it would not be unreasonable for us to give the U.S.S.R. any of our devices
which they may not have developed yet and which would stretch out their
warning and response time, and give them the opportunity to gather and ap-
praise more reliable &dquo;negative&dquo; intelligence. Thus if they are behind us in back-
scatter or other long-range, missile-detecting radar (and the evidence is that they
are), it would be prudent to give it to them immediately. Likewise, if we are
ahead of them in perfecting the solid-fueled rocket, the initiation of whose fir-
ing process can be put off until the last possible moment, it might be wise to make
this, too, available to them. These proposals may be unorthodox, but these are
dangerous times for adhering to the conventional wisdom. Or, as the game
theorists put it, this is not the occasion for playing deterrence as if it were a zero-
sum game, in which what is advantageous for one is always thought to be dis-
advantageous for the other. Certain outcomes could be advantageous to each,
just as some could be disastrous to each. 22
21 The most dramatic (publicized) example of a mis-reading occurred on October 5, 1960, when
the BMEWS station at Thule, Greenland, transmitted a moon echo to NORAD as a "pos-
sible" missile attack. Despite the fulfillment of the mechanical requirements for preliminary
retaliatory measures, Canadian Air Marshal Slemon "disregarded" the radar return. See the
varying interpretations of this event in Boston Traveler, December 13, 1960, p. 40; New York
Times, December 23, 1960, p. 10; and Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 1, 1960, p.
13. Also see two popularized stories: John G. Hubbell, "You Are Under Attack - The
Strange Incident of October 5," Reader’s Digest, April 1961, pp. 37-41; and Peter Wyden,
"The Chances of Accidental War," Saturday Evening Post, June 3, 1961, pp. 17 ff.
22 An excellent introduction to this mode of analyzing internation bargaining is Anatol Rapoport,
Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).
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THE LIMITS OF STABILITY
Having discussed the wide range of possible means by which each side might
unilaterally contribute to the stability of the balance of terror, let us now turn
briefly to the limits which do, nevertheless, exist. The foregoing examination
might persuade the reader that if each side will only demonstrate sophistication,
prudence, and awareness of the psychological impact of one’s own acts, we can
continue to live quite safely under the umbrella of a stable deterrent. But such,
alas, may be too optimistic a conclusion. Let us examine, briefly, the sorts of as-
sumptions one must make in order to expect the balance to remain stable over
any significant period of time.
Firstly, one must assume that neither side is already committed to an ulti-
mate attack against the other. If one side is so committed, the other’s deterrent
and prevent-the-war policies must give way to greater emphasis on win-the-war
policies, thus contributing to a growing instability of the balance. That some
Soviet and Western planners are willing to subordinate prevent-the-war to win-
the-war policies indicates that they do, in fact, accept the inevitability of an
enemy strike.
Secondly, one must be convinced that the two super-powers are - and will
remain - in complete control of the situation, and that no third power could
or would intervene to upset the equilibrium. This conviction presumes, in
turn, that those that are likely to acquire a nuclear-missile capability will exer-
cise the same restraint as we, the British, and the Soviets, and that those who will
not exhibit such restraint are not going to acquire that capability.23
Thirdly, faith in the stable deterrent presupposes that at all times each side
will find the military stand-off preferable to any other state of affairs and will
never have any military, political, economic, or psychological incentive for up-
setting it. The validity of this broad assumption rests, in turn, upon several more
specific - and equally dubious - ones. A key premise is that at no time will
either side find itself in a situation in which it preceives a military advantage in
surprise attack. The corollary of this is that neither will find itself in a situation
which leads it to believe that the other preceives an advantage to itself in striking
first. The former development could produce a &dquo;preventive&dquo; strike, and the lat-
ter could lead to a pre-emptive strike. 24 As to the developments which could
upset these two assumptions, there are several which come readily to mind.
One could be the acquisition of an important new weapons system. For
example, if one side were to develop a highly effective defense against missiles,
it might calculate that enough of the retaliatory blow could be intercepted to
make the cost of victory acceptably JOW.2-1 Again, the corollary is that if one side
23 Several implications of the Nth power problem are explored systematically in Arthur Lee Burns,
The Rationale of Catalytic War (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1959 [Research
Memo No. 3]).
24 By preventive strike we refer to one initiated in order to deprive the adversary of the first strike
which you expect him to launch at some future date. Pre-emptive strike refers to one
launched on the basis of a belief that the adversary is just about to, or already has, launched
an attack upon you.
25 It should be remembered that "acceptability" of damage is a function of industrialization, popula-
tion size and concentration, and national values; if China’s value system is revealed in cur-
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discovered (or believed) that the other was about to produce such a weapon,
it would (in the atmosphere of continuing hostility and suspicion) have to as-
sume that the breakthrough would eventually be exploited either militarily or
diplomatically. If the expected exploitation were thought to be military, there
would be tremendous incentive for the other to strike first, before he is com-
pletely disadvantaged. And if the anticipation of exploitation were thought to
be primarily diplomatic blackmail, he might likewise be willing to risk all in order
to avoid being so threatened later. Another technological breakthrough that
could produce these consequences is in the target detection realm. When (not
if, but when) one side is able to pin-point most of the other’s missile sites -
probably via reconnaissance satellites - it will probably be in a position to ob-
literate enough of their retaliatory capability to make the costs of victory accept-
able. In the same vein, as ASW (anti-submarine warfare) techniques improve,
even the Polaris system becomes increasingly vulnerable to detection and destruc-
tion, and hence decreasingly able to provide the stable deterrent. Though under-
water detection is most difficult and several years of work are required for a
breakthrough, the event seems almost inevitable, and this &dquo;ultimate weapon&dquo;
then joins the ranks of its many predecessors
Another development which could upset the stability assumption would be
the acquisition by one side of such political or economic assets as to permit it to
dictate terms to the other. Faced with this gradually evolving prospect, the loser
would have considerable incentive to fight now rather than be &dquo;nibbled to death&dquo;
by diplomatic threat later.
In addition to the assumptions which must be made if one wants to posit the
continuing lack of incentive for launching a preventive blow, there are those
which apply to continuing restraint regarding a pre-emptive blow, and these are
only a little less encouraging. Most crucial here is the assumption that at no time
will either side engage in a test, practice, alert, maneuver, or deployment which
has enough of the earmarks of a surprise attack to convince the other that it has
no choice but to &dquo;pre-empt.&dquo; There are many equivalents of the meteors or
geese on the radar scope, and if they not only look like planes or missiles on radar,
but turn out to be such, and seem to be headed for your territory, the incentive
to get your &dquo;strike-back&dquo; forces launched will be compelling. And missiles, un-
like planes, are not recallable; there is no &dquo;fail-safe&dquo; rendezvous point at which
they can turn around and come home.
Also in the category of events which might lead to what the initiator thinks
of as a pre-emptive or forestalling blow, is that which produces a series of steps of
lethal reciprocity. For example, if one side were to intercept signals believed to be
the order for surprise attack, and it merely went into an intermediate condition
of alert, the other might well interpret the alert as the beginning of a possible at-
rent behavior, and she suffers from (or enjoys?) overpopulation during the period between
acquisition of nuclear-missile capability and intensive industrialization, she might be willing
to take losses far greater than those acceptable to the U.S.S.R. or the NATO powers.
26 See House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Ocean Sciences and Na-
tional Security (Washington: G.P.O., 1960); and Norman Precoda, On the Fleet Ballistic
Missile System ... (Santa Barbara: General Electric Co., October 1958).
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tack, and thus go into its own form of alert. With this, or any of the events cited
above, we can quickly get into a self-generating sequence whose ultimate result
is mutual devastation.27 Whether one talks of communication breakdown, elec-
tronic illusion, aggressive alert, or the disobedient or incompetent officer, one can
see a range of possible ways in which the delicate balance can be upset. It is im-
portant to appreciate that these possibilities are being prepared against and that
there is still more which both sides can do to prevent accidental war; further-
more, the command and control procedures are laden with a multitude of oner-
ous checks, vetoes, and negators. Thus, the probability of these specific events
which can lead to accidental pre-emption is not particularly high, but it is cer-
tainly well above zero, and that should be a matter of concern to all.
STABLE DETERRENCE - STEPPING STONE TO DISARMAMENT
In the central part of this article, we examined the possible techniques by
which we and the Soviets - alone or together - might contribute to the stability
of our present and foreseeable military standoff. The major technique is, of
course, the acquisition of mutually invulnerable deterrent forces, but it should by
now be evident that there is no such thing as an invulnerable deterrent. All
weapon systems are vulnerable; it is just that some are less vulnerable than others.
And whatever technique one employs to minimize vulnerability, there are always
other less attractive implications. Hardening, dispersal, distance, and numbers
are costly, time consuming, lead to a quantitative race, and may well call forth
heavier attacks than might otherwise be thought necessary. Mobility and con-
cealment are likewise costly, lead to their own kind of tension-generating weapons
race, can never be fully successful, and are inevitably susceptible to techno-
logical upset.
Turning from the elusive search for invulnerability to the pursuit of active
defense and early warning systems, we likewise find ourselves confronted with a
chimera. If we do not have an effective air defense, our retaliatory forces are
more vulnerable, but if one of us acquires it before the other, the incentive to
strike first rises sharply - on both sides. And in the search for long-range early
warning, we find that a system which maximizes warning time enhances stability,
but that if it is also good enough to locate the launch site it plays havoc with the
other’s invulnerability and creates incentives to instability.
Added to these disconcerting limitations and dilemmas in the stable deter-
rence picture are those of a less technological nature. First of all, we can never
forget that every strike-back weapon is also a strike-first weapon; just because some
are not particularly good for strike-back, it does not follow that the others are
only good for that mission. Secondly, we are often apt, in the fascination of our
strategic calculations, to forget that the key decisions in preserving the stable
deterrent relationship will be, for some time to come, made by mortal man with
all his frailties. How easy it is for us to assume that our &dquo;players&dquo; are totally ra-
tional, completely informed, insusceptible to deviation or breakdown under stress,
27 For a realistic, but more optimistic, discussion of these and other possibilities, see Herman Kahn,
"The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," loc. cit., supra.
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unswervingly dedicated to peace and stability, and never will defy orders or
violate procedures. Similarly, what confidence we place in our scanning, detec,
tion, identification, and communication equipment! If devices as simple as an
electric typewriter or transistor radio can break down, how much more likely are
our complex computers, facsimile machines, and command networks to do so.
Human history is strewn with the wreckage left by failures in man-machine
systems; Pearl Harbor was only one of the more dramatic cases.
Finally, one must bear in mind that behind our fallible military personnel
and their fallible equipment, lie the most fallible of all human creations - na-
tional governments. It may be true that collective decisions tend to be more
orthodox and conservative than individual decisions, but orthodox decisions
have led many nations in many eras into the inferno of war. How can we be
assured that groups under a multitude of stressful and threatening conditions
will adhere to the dicta of rationality; and the wrong decision could be made in
moments of calm as well as in moments of crisis. Governments are susceptible
to a staggering array of forces, many of which lead in destructive directions.
Moreover, as has already been suggested several times, there will certainly be oc-
casions in the next few years when the most &dquo;rational&dquo; decision some govern-
ments can take is to launch the very strike which plunges all of us into nuclear
war.
The point to be made is that the principle of deterrence via threatened re-
prisal is ancient, and that it has enjoyed only a very limited success. The new
deterrence is somewhat more carefully calculated than its predecessors and its
probability of effectiveness may perhaps be a shade higher, but the implications of
its failure are infinitely greater than in any other period. Certainly we must
strive to build as much stability as we can into our bipolar deterrent, but it will
never be enough. One can only look with amazement upon the enthusiasm and
confidence with which the stable deterrent strategy has been embraced.
What is particularly distressing is not that there is such widespread faith
in the stability of deterrence, but that this faith is being increasingly shared by
the disillusioned proponents of disarmament. All of the arguments which the
latter used to level at the gross armers are only slightly less applicable to the
sophisticated deterrers, yet because disarmament has encountered such rough
going and because the deterrers speak like reasonable and peaceful men, the
champions of the only approach which offers any long-range prospects have suc-
cumbed to the newest nostrum of the military metaphysics.
This is not a call for the disarmament advocates to return to their original
innocence and purity, nor for the seekers of the stable deterrent to throw up their
hands in despair. Rather what is urged is that both recognize the limits and
transitory nature of such a strategy, and pursue it for what it is - a temporary
state of affairs which may enable us to buy time. What we and the other powers
do with that time is crucial. As each new weapon system moves from drawing
board to operational status, it becomes increasingly difficult to control, limit, or
eliminate. First, we let control of the nuclear warhead elude our grasp; then the
ICBM; and now the space satellite and BCR systems are fast becoming uncon-
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trollable. How many more such errors can the nations make before it is too late?
In the long run only comprehensive and enforced disarmament can offer any
genuine national security, and it may well involve no more effort, ingenuity, and
cost than the more modest goal. Stable deterrence - yes, but only as a way sta-
tion to comprehensive disarmament under supranational control.
